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[我的偶像是爱因斯坦英文作文]我的偶像爱因斯坦有人的偶像是歌星，是球星，是名演员。而我的偶像是“爱因斯坦”，我承认自己无法读懂爱因斯坦，但我更得承认是爱因斯坦让我的心中再次升腾起了感动。之前从未发...+阅读

你好，我在校内数据库外文知网搜的。所以你打不开。就不给地址了，希望对你有用。 Cooperation and the CommonsSustainably managing common natural resources, such as fisheries, water, and forests, is essential for our long-term survival. Many analysts have assumed, however, that people will maximize short-term self-benefits—for example, by cutting as much firewood as they can sell—and warned that this behavior will inevitably produce a “tragedy of the commons”

(1), such as a stripped forest that no longer produces wood for anyone. But in laboratory simulations of such social dilemmas, the outcome is not always tragedy. Instead, a basic finding is that humans do not universally maximize short-term self-benefits, and can cooperate to produce shared, long-term benefits (2, 3). Similar findings have come from field studies of commonly managed resources (6–7). It has been challenging, however, to directly relate laboratory findings to resource conditions in the field, and identify the conditions that enhance cooperation. On page 961 of this issue, Rustagi et al.

(8) help fill this gap. In an innovative study of Ethiopia's Oromo people, they use economic experiments and forest growth data to show that groups that had a higher proportion of “conditional cooperators” were more likely to invest in forest patrols aimed at enforcing firewood collection rules—and had more productive forests. They also show that other factors, including a group's distance to markets and the quality of its leadership, influenced the success of cooperative management. Researchers have translated social dilemmas into economic games in which the players—typically college students in the United States or Europe—can earn real money, depending on whether they and others “invest” in a common good, or become “free riders” who benefit without paying their fair share. Cardenas

(9) was the first to translate a game carried out with students using computers in a lab

(5) into a pen-and-paper version that was played by actual users of local forests in Colombia. This field effort essentially replicated the lab findings, but the levels of cooperative behavior observed were more variable. Other field experiments examined how people who relied on forests, fisheries, and grazing lands responded to experimental designs that enabled them to impose sanctions on free riders, including varying monetary penalties (10, 11). Several examined whether rules established by an external authority—such as a government—“crowded out” a group's motivation to cooperate In Ethiopia's Bale Mountains, Rustagi et al. took these experiments a step further. There, high livestock density poses a major threat to forests, because the animals browse on young trees. To address this and other problems, officials launched a forest management program that gave Bale Oromo groups common ownership of woodlands, and responsibility for maintaining forest cover. To explore the role of cooperation in the success of these efforts, Rustagi et al. first set up “field labs” in a number of villages, and invited residents to play games designed to measure their propensity to cooperate (conditional on others' cooperation). They also conducted surveys that gathered socioeconomic data and information about resource monitoring efforts. Finally, they compared the game results and the survey data from 49 groups to measurements of potential crop trees, an indicator of forest productivity. Overall, they found that the groups with the larger shares of conditionally cooperative members were more likely to be successful in managing their forest commons. They also invested more in “costly” enforcement of cooperation (participating in forest patrols, which promote cooperation by sanctioning free riders). By establishing this link between the levels of cooperation observed in field labs with local forest conditions, Rustagi et al. have increased the confidence that scholars can have in the external validity of results from previous experiments carried out all over the world, with student and nonstudent subjects. In addition, by adding to findings showing diverse levels of cooperation in social dilemmas, rather than no cooperation, they support the growing acceptance of a behavioral theory of human action (14): Individuals facing dilemmas, who learn from experience and adopt a norm of conditional cooperation, achieve levels of cooperation that increase over time—if a sufficient number of conditional cooperators are present. If a group is composed of a substantial number of free riders, however, cooperation levels fall over time. One way of i...